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We study the theoretical relationship between inﬂation, welfare and price dispersion. Empirically
it has been found that higher rates of inﬂation increase price dispersion.1 This regularity is
important for eﬃciency concerns because price dispersion may create an ineﬃciency by driving
a wedge between marginal costs and marginal utilities. If inﬂation widens price dispersion, it
could then exacerbate the ineﬃciency. Although many theoretical models have tried to capture
this intuitive welfare consequence of inﬂation, they often lack a microfoundation for money that
is necessary for a coherent welfare analysis.2 In the current paper, we use the Kiyotaki-Wright
[12] matching/search framework to provide a strong microfoundation for money. We discard their
rigid assumptions of indivisible money and goods, and endogenize search intensity, so that we
can analyze the consequences of money growth on price dispersion and search decisions.
The structure of the model is a blend between [12] and [18, 19]. From [12] we borrow the
fundamental trading frictions that make money essential. That is, agents are anonymous, barter
is diﬃcult, and the frequency of meetings between agents is ﬁnite. These frictions are cast in
a decentralized market where buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally to determine the terms
of trade through bargaining. Also borrowed from [12] are heterogeneous preferences, whose role
will be described later. We embed these elements into the structure in [18, 19], where the basic
decision unit is a large household whose members share the matching risks. This integrated
structure allows us to tractably analyze how money growth and inﬂation aﬀect money’s ability
to eﬃciently allocate goods across heterogeneous consumers.3
Price dispersion in this paper is generated by heterogeneous preferences and trading frictions.
There is a continuum of goods. A household derives utility from all goods but has a smooth
1For instance, see [13, 17, 8]. Reinsdorf [17] ﬁnds that unexpected inﬂation has negative eﬀects on price
dispersion, while the positive relationship is preserved between expected inﬂation and price dispersion. Reinsdorf
also presents a concise survey of the theoretical literature.
2Most of previous models in this ﬁeld combine consumer search with money in the utility function, e.g., [1, 2].
Costly search by consumers gives ﬁrms some monopoly power to set price above marginal cost, and the cost to
adjust prices induces ﬁrms to adjust prices in the S-s fashion. When all ﬁrms do not adjust their prices at the same
time, money growth increases price dispersion across ﬁrms and increases search. Intensive search reduces ﬁrms’
m o n o p o l yp o w e ra n d ,a sB e n a b o u[ 2 ]s h o w s ,t h i se ﬃciency gain can outweigh the increased search cost.
3In the Kiyotaki-Wright [12] framework, [16, 7] are among the ﬁrst to analyze the relationship between inﬂation
and price dispersion, but they assume that there is a smallest (indivisible) unit of money. The papers most similar
to ours are [4, 11]. Berentsen and Rocheteau [4] assume heterogeneous preferences as we do, but they do not focus
on price dispersion. Head and Kumar [11] speciﬁcally look at price dispersion, by exploring the mechanism of price
dispersion from [6]. This mechanism, complementary to ours, assumes that some buyers have more information
about prices than other buyers.
1preference ordering over the goods. The further away a good’s type is from the household’s
preferred good, the lower the marginal utility of consuming the good. Diﬀerent households have
diﬀerent preference orderings over the goods. This heterogeneity by itself does not generate price
dispersion but, in the presence of trading frictions, it does. When a seller meets a buyer who
values the good very much, the seller can sell the good for a high price. However, when the buyer
in the match does not value the good much, the seller may choose to sell the good to the buyer
at a low price rather than withholding the good for a future match, because the matching rate is
ﬁnite. In our model, the distribution of prices is the same for every good.
We ﬁrst study the version of the model where buyers’ search intensity is exogenous. In this
model, a household divides the matches into desirable ones and mediocre ones. In desirable
matches where the buyer likes the seller’s good very much, the buyer is constrained by his money
holdings; namely, his holdings are not enough to compel the producer to produce as much as the
buyer wishes. Meanwhile, in mediocre matches the buyer does not like the seller’s good enough to
spend all his money. An increase in money growth (or inﬂation) reduces the real value of money,
reduces the quantity of goods produced in desirable matches, and hence increases (real) prices of
such goods.4 By contrast, the lowest price of goods remains at zero, because it occurs in the least
desirable match where the buyer does not want to buy the good. Thus, an increase in money
growth widens the range of real prices. The variance of prices increases with money growth in a
wide range of parameter values, but the general response is ambiguous.
In the basic model, money growth reduces eﬃciency and increases velocity of money. As
the value of money falls with money growth, households can purchase less of the desirable goods.
This causes households to substitute consumption from desirable goods into mediocre goods. The
result is a reduction in quality-weighted consumption and hence in welfare. Common to most
models of money, the Friedman rule is optimal in this setting. Also, the shift in consumption to
mediocre goods requires that the buyers in mediocre matches spend a higher percentage of their
money holdings. Thus, velocity of money rises, as in [18, 19, 3, 20].
Next, we endogenize buyers’ search intensity. In this environment, multiple equilibria can
arise from the interaction between search intensity and the ineﬃciency in the allocation of goods.
If a household believes that other households will search intensively so that the eﬃciency in the
allocation of goods will be high, then a household will choose to search intensively. The reverse
4Throughout this paper, the term “price” refers to the price of a good normalized by the money stock.
2happens if a household believes that other households will not search so quite intensively. The
possible equilibria can be ranked by the ineﬃciency in the allocation of goods. Across equilibria
the larger is the ineﬃciency the lower is welfare and the lower is search intensity.
In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth increases the range of prices
and reduces welfare. These eﬀects happen for the same reasons as in the model with constant
search intensity. However, search intensity responds to money growth ambiguously. For low
growth rates of money, an increase can raise search intensity, while for high growth rates, an
increase lowers search intensity. The result will depend upon whether increasing the ineﬃciency
in the allocation of goods raises the surplus to a buyer in a match or lowers it. When the surplus
increases, search intensity increases. When the surplus decreases, search intensity decreases.
Search intensity necessarily rises with money growth only in the equilibria ranked the second,
fourth, etc., in welfare. In these equilibria, money growth also increases eﬃciency and welfare.
Thus, only an inferior equilibrium necessarily generates a positive association of search intensity
with both inﬂation and welfare. In such an equilibrium, however, money growth reduces the
range of prices. In no equilibrium does money growth (or inﬂation) simultaneously increase
search intensity, the range of prices, and welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model with
ﬁxed search intensity. The equilibrium in this economy is described in section 3 and the eﬀects
of money growth in section 4. Section 5 endogenizes search intensity. Section 6 discusses the
stability of steady states and uneven allocations of money among buyers. Section 7 concludes the
paper and the appendices provide necessary proofs.
2. The model
2.1. Environment
The model incorporates the setup of heterogeneous goods and preferences from [12] into the search
monetary framework in [18, 19] with divisible money and goods. Goods are perfectly divisible,
non-storable, and their types are identiﬁed by points on a circle of circumference 2. A continuum
of households with unit mass are uniformly distributed and indexed by points on the same circle.
A household located at point h on the circle can produce good h and only good h.T h e c o s t
of producing q units is c(q), where c0 > 0, c00 > 0, c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, and c0(∞)=∞.E a c h
household is composed of an inﬁnite number of members, who are exogenously divided into a
3fraction N of buyers and a fraction 1 − N producers/sellers. Buyers carry money and sellers
productive capacity to the market to exchange, as described in detail below.5
Each household has a preferred type of good from which they derive the most utility. For
any other good, the household’s preference decreases in the distance (i.e., the shortest arc length)
between the good and the preferred good. Denote this distance by z. The quality of the good
to the household is a(z), with a0 < 0, a(0) < ∞ and a(1) = 0. Also, a household’s output is a
distance 1 from its preferred good, so that there is no utility from consuming one’s own output.
Let q(z) be the quantity consumed of a good of quality a(z). The household’s quality-weighted





where α is the probability with which a buyer meets a seller. Normalize α =1 /N.U t i l i t y p e r
period from consumption is u(y). Assume u0 > 0, u00 ≤ 0, and u0(0) ≥ u0 ≥ u0(∞), where u0 is a
suﬃciently large, positive number.
In addition to goods there is an intrinsically worthless, divisible object called money. Let M
be the stock of money per household and m the money holdings of a particular household.
Time is discrete and the discount factor is β ∈ (0,1). At the start of each period a household
allocates an equal amount of money, m/N, to each of its buyers. Then the producers enter the
market, setting up production at ﬁxed locations to sell goods to buyers. Buyers enter the market
to buy goods. A buyer meets a seller with probability α (= 1/N) and a seller meets a buyer with
probability αN/(1−N)=1 /(1−N). We assume that two producers never meet with each other.
This implies that barter does not arise, and so every trade is an exchange of money for goods.
This is a simplifying assumption, not a necessary one for our analysis.6
A match is characterized by the distance of the producer’s good from the buyer’s preferred
good, z, and the buyer’s money holdings, m/N. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the
producer, which speciﬁes the amounts of goods, q, and money, x, to be exchanged. If the seller
5The inﬁnite number of members in each household ensures that even though members may have diﬀerent
outcomes in their individual matches, the randomness from the matching process is smoothed out at the household
level, which makes the model tractable. Furthermore, household members are assumed to act in the best interests
of the household. For more analysis of the household assumption, such as the endogenous determination of the
division N, see [18, 19].
6As [9, 4] have shown in similar environments, money can still be valuable even when every match has a double
coincidence of wants. Two randomly matched agents may have very asymmetric tastes for each other’s goods, in
w h i c hc a s et h e yw i l lc h o o s et oe x c h a n g ew i t hm o n e ya st h em e d i u mo fe x c h a n g e . T h e yb a r t e ro n l yi nm a t c h e s
where tastes are not very asymmetric.
4accepts the oﬀer, he immediately produces the quantity of goods speciﬁed in the oﬀer for the
speciﬁed amount of money. After trade the producers and buyers return to the household. The
household collects money and goods from the members. All members consume the same amount.
Before the next period the household receives a lump-sum transfer of money, τ.
In the remainder of this section, we will analyze a particular household’s decisions. We use
lower-case variables to denote this household’s decisions, and capital-case letters the aggregate
variables. The state variable for a particular household is m, the amount of money it possesses
at the start of a period. Let v(m) denote the value function, where the dependence on aggregate
variables is suppressed. Let ω be the value of next period’s money, discounted to the current
period. Then,
ω = βv0(m+1)
where the subscript +1 indicates that the variable is one period ahead.
2.2. A particular household’s decisions
We analyze the household’s trade decisions ﬁrst and then its decisions on (c,m+1). The trade
decisions consist of the acceptance strategies for producers and proposal strategies for buyers.
Since the buyer in a match makes take it or leave it oﬀers, the producer’s household instructs
the producer to accept an oﬀer if and only if the oﬀer generates a non-negative surplus. So, we
omit the notation for the seller’s strategy and focus on the decision by the buyer’s household
on the quantities of trade, (q,x). When choosing (q,x), the household takes as given other
households’ value of money, Ω,p r o p o s a l s ,( X,Q), and acceptance strategies. In addition, since
an agent is atomistic in his household, his trade has no eﬀect on the household’s marginal utility
of consumption.
Consider a match in which the producer’s good is of quality a(z) to the buyer’s household.
An oﬀer of x units of money for q units of goods yields a surplus [u0(y)a(z)q − xω] to the buyer
and a surplus [xΩ − c(q)] to the producer. The oﬀer maximizes the buyer’s surplus, subject to
the producer’s acceptance and the constraint on money, x ≤ m/N. Because the producer accepts
an oﬀer as long as the surplus is non-negative, the oﬀer will set the producer’s surplus to zero,
resulting in x = c(q)/Ω.T h u s ,t h eo ﬀer (q,x) maximizes [u0(y)a(z)q − xω] subject to
x = c(q)/Ω ≤ m/N. (2.1)





x∗ (z)=c(q∗ (z))/Ω, (2.3)
c(q∗(¯ z)) = Ωm/N. (2.4)
Denote ¯ x = m/N and ¯ q = q∗(¯ z). Then, the optimal oﬀer satisﬁes a cut-oﬀ rule detailed in the
following lemma (the proof is omitted):





(¯ q, ¯ x), if z ≤ ¯ z
(q∗(z),x ∗(z)), if ¯ z<z≤ 1.
(2.5)
The cut-oﬀ level ¯ z divides the continuum of goods into two subsets, (¯ z,1] and [0, ¯ z]. If the
good in a match has z ∈ (¯ z,1] to the buyer’s household, the buyer’s household does not like the
good very much, and so the buyer will trade only a fraction of his money for the good. In this
case, the quantity of goods traded maximizes total surplus in the trade, [u0(y)a(z)q − c(q)]. If
the good in a match is very valuable to the buyer’s household, i.e., if z ∈ [0, ¯ z], the buyer likes
to purchase a large quantity of the good, but his money holdings constrain how much he can
purchase. In this case, the buyer spends all his money, and the quantity of goods traded is less
than the amount which maximizes total surplus in the trade.
Figure 1 here.
We will refer to goods in [0, ¯ z] as the household’s desirable goods and those in [¯ z,1] mediocre
goods. These divisions are the household’s choices. Similarly, we refer to a match with z ∈ [0, ¯ z]
as a desirable match and a match with z ∈ [¯ z,1] a mediocre match. Figure 1 illustrates q(z). In
desirable matches, the constant quantity ¯ q is traded. In mediocre matches, the quantity traded
declines until no goods are traded in the limit at z =1 . T h a ti s ,q∗0(z) < 0a n dq∗(1) = 0.
Similarly, x∗0(z) < 0a n dx∗(1) = 0.
Following the above trade decisions, the household will receive the following quality-weighted
quantity of goods:








a(t)dt.( 2 . 7 )
Because goods are non-storable, the household will consume all of the goods, and so y is also the





where m+1 denotes the household’s money holdings at the beginning of the next period given as:























The two terms following the transfer τ are the total amount of money obtained in the current
period by the household’s sellers and the amount spent by the buyers. Note the distinction
between the household’s own choices (¯ z,q,m) and other households’ choices ( ¯ Z,Q,M).












This equation requires that the current value of money, ω−1/β, be equal to the sum of the
future value of money and the non-pecuniary service or return that money yields in the current
trades. The service, given by the term following ω in the above equation, comes from money’s
role in relaxing the money constraint (2.1). For given ω, this amount of service is an increasing
function of ¯ z because, the wider the range of trades in which the money constraint binds, the
more frequently a marginal unit of money serves the role of relieving the constraint.
3. Symmetric equilibrium
3.1. Deﬁnition and existence
We focus on symmetric monetary equilibria. A symmetric monetary equilibrium consists of an
individual household’s decisions (q(z),x(z),m +1), the implied value ω, and other households’
decisions and values, (Q(z),X(z),Ω), that meet the following requirements: (i) The quantities
of trade in a symmetric equilibrium, (q(z),x(z)), are optimal given (Q(z),X(z),Ω), i.e., they
satisfy (2.5); (ii) ω satisﬁes (2.9); (iii) Individual decisions equal aggregate decisions, i.e., q(z)=
Q(z), x(z)=X (z), and ω = Ω; (iv) The value of the money stock is positive and bounded, i.e.,
0 < ω−1m/β < ∞ for all t.
7Of interest is the steady state of the equilibrium under a constant money growth rate. Mone-
tary transfer in each period is τ = m+1 − m =( γ − 1)m,w h e r eγ > 0 is the (gross) money
growth rate. In such a steady state, the total value of money (ωM) is constant. So that












A steady state can be determined recursively, by determining ¯ z ﬁrst. In fact, (3.1) determines
¯ z independently of all other variables. Under the maintained assumptions on a(.), it is easy to
show that (3.1) has a unique solution for ¯ z iﬀ β ≤ γ < ∞. Denote this solution as ¯ Z(γ). Then,
¯ Z(γ) > 0 for all γ > β, ¯ Z(β)=0a n d ¯ Z(∞)=1 .
Next, we determine quality-weighted consumption, y. To do so, express all other variables as
functions of (y,¯ z). Emphasizing the dependence of the quantity q∗ on (y,z), we write:




Then, ¯ q = Q(y,¯ z). Similarly, we can rewrite (2.6) as follows:




The following lemma (proven in Appendix A) states that (3.1) has a unique solution for y.T h i s
lemma and the unique solution for ¯ z imply the ensuing proposition.
Lemma 3.1. For any given ¯ z ≥ 0, (3.3) has a unique solution for y. Denote this solution as
Y (¯ z).T h e nY (¯ z) > 0 and Y 0(¯ z) ≤ 0 (where the equality holds only when ¯ z =0 ).
Proposition 3.2. There is a unique monetary steady state iﬀ γ ∈ [β,∞). In the steady state,
¯ z>0 if and only if γ > β.
3.2. Price dispersion
The term “price” refers to the price of a good normalized by the money stock per buyer. Fix a
particular type of good. If the seller of the good encounters a buyer whose preferred good is a








8Since z is uniformly distributed over the circle, there is a distribution of prices over the same type
of good. This distribution is identical for all types of goods because goods are symmetric.





¯ p ≡ 1/¯ q, if z ≤ ¯ z,
p∗ (z) ≡
c(q∗(z))
q∗(z)c(¯ q), if ¯ z<z≤ 1.
(3.4)
Prices are constant for z ∈ [0, ¯ z]. For z ∈ (¯ z,1), p∗0(z) < 0.7 Also, the lowest price occurs at
z =1 ,a n di ti sp ≡ c0(0)/c(¯ q)=0 .T h u s ,p∗ & p as z % 1. Figure 2 illustrates p(z).
Figure 2 here.
4. Eﬀects of money growth
We now examine the eﬀects of a permanent increase in the money growth rate on the steady
state. All proofs for the results in this section appear in Appendix B.
4.1. On trade decisions and price dispersion
Money growth has the following eﬀects on the trade decisions:
Proposition 4.1. d¯ z/dγ > 0, dy/dγ < 0, d¯ q/dγ < 0,a n ddq∗(z)/dγ ≥ 0 for all z ∈ (¯ z,1).A l s o ,
an increase in γ increases prices of each type of good. The range and the mean of prices increase,
but the standard deviation of prices may either increase or decrease.
To understand these eﬀects, let us start with ¯ z. A higher money growth rate makes the value
of money deteriorate more quickly between periods. To induce a household to hold money in this
case, the amount of non-pecuniary service that money generates in trades must increase. Because
money generates service by relaxing the money constraint in the range of matches with z ∈ [0, ¯ z],
for it to generate higher services, ¯ z must increase to widen this range.
The quantity of goods traded in a desirable match, ¯ q, falls when money growth increases. In
a desirable match, the buyer likes to buy a large quantity of the good but is constrained by his
money holdings. An increase in money growth exacerbates the money constraint by reducing the
value of money (i.e., ωm/N). Thus, the quantity of goods traded in such a match falls.
7T h en e g a t i v es i g no fp
∗0 (z) follows from the assumptions that c(0) = 0 and c is convex, along with the fact
that q
∗(z)i sd e c r e a s i n g .
9The reduction in the amount of desirable goods reduces quality-weighted consumption, y,
because these goods deliver higher utility to the household. To smooth consumption, the house-
hold counters the reduction in y by increasing consumption of mediocre goods, i.e., by increasing
q∗ (z)f o re a c hz ∈ (¯ z,1).8 The increase in mediocre goods only mitigates, but does not completely
oﬀset, the reduction in quality-weighted consumption caused by the fall in ¯ q. Figure 1 illustrates
these eﬀects of an increase in money growth on q(z).
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of a higher growth rate of money on prices. Prices of all goods,
except for z = 1, increase. The price of desirable goods increases, because higher money growth
lowers the value to money, as shown by the decrease in ¯ q. However, there is a second eﬀect on
goods purchased in mediocre matches. Since agents substitute consumption into mediocre goods,
and production costs are increasing in q, the higher demand for mediocre goods raises prices of
such goods more proportionally than those of desirable goods. However, the price of goods at
the far end z = 1 stays at zero under the assumption c0(0) = 0. As a result, the range of prices
unambiguously widens with an increase in money growth.
In addition, the shape of the price distribution changes. As money growth increases ¯ z,t h e
mass of the price distribution at the level ¯ p increases. Thus, higher order statistics of the price
distribution, such as the standard deviation, may either increase or decrease with money growth.
4.2. On velocity of money and output
Our model generates endogenous velocity of money, as in related models such as [18, 19, 3, 20].
Denoted V,v e l o c i t yi sd e ﬁned in the usual way as the ratio of nominal output to the money
stock. Nominal output is
R 1
0 p(z)q(z)dz.( T h i sd i ﬀers from quality weighted output, y, because













Because an increase in the money growth rate reduces ¯ q and increases q∗ (z) for all z ∈ [¯ z,1),
velocity of money rises. Another way to express this result is that an increase in money growth
increases the weighted sum of output in matches, where the weights are prices.
To understand the rise in velocity, it is useful to uncover the source of endogenous velocity.
For each trade with z ∈ [0, ¯ z], the buyer’s money constraint binds. In such a trade, nominal
8As is clear from the explanation, q
∗(z) would remain unchanged for z ∈ [¯ z,1] if the marginal utility of con-
sumption is constant.
10output is equal to the buyer’s money holdings and so velocity is constant. In contrast, a trade
with z ∈ (¯ z,1] does not suﬀer from a binding money constraint. Nominal output in such a trade
responds to money growth disproportionately relative to the money stock. This is the source of
endogenous velocity and the positive response of velocity to money growth.9
4.3. On social welfare
To analyze the welfare eﬀect of money growth, we ﬁrst characterize the eﬃcient allocation chosen
by a ﬁctional social planner who is constrained by the matching technology. The social planner












The allocation qo satisﬁes qo(z)=c0−1 (u0(yo)a(z)) and the cutoﬀ level ¯ zo is zero. The eﬃcient








Similar to Lemma 3.1, there is a unique solution for y to the above equation. Therefore, there is
a unique steady state of the eﬃcient allocation.
Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium steady state is eﬃcient iﬀ γ = β. For all γ > β, the equi-
librium steady state has the following properties: y<y o, ¯ z>¯ zo =0 , and social welfare is a
decreasing function of γ.
Money growth reduces social welfare, despite the fact that it increases nominal output rel-
ative to the money stock. This is because an increase in money growth reduces a household’s
consumption of desirable goods, increases consumption of mediocre goods, and hence reduces
quality-weighted consumption. Although output weighted by prices rises, it is output of mediocre
goods that rises. The household would prefer to consume more desirable goods and less mediocre
goods. This can be achieved by increasing the marginal value of money (ω) through a reduction
in money growth. Therefore, the so-called Friedman rule (i.e., γ = β)r e s t o r e se ﬃciency.
9A change in the money growth rate also changes the range of trades in which the money constraint binds.
This can be another source of endogenous velocity when the change in money growth is large. However, when the
money growth rate changes only marginally, the eﬀect of ¯ z itself on velocity is negligible.
115. Endogenous search intensity of buyers
It is sometimes argued that inﬂation, by widening price dispersion, induces buyers to search and
hence increases welfare (e.g., [1]). We examine this issue now by endogenizing buyers’ search
intensity. All proofs for this section are delegated to Appendix C.
5.1. Decisions and optimal conditions
Consider a particular household again. This household chooses the search intensity for each
of its buyers, denoted i, in addition to other decisions described earlier. Because all buyers
in the household hold the same amount of money, it is optimal for them to have the same
search intensity (In section 6 we will show that it is optimal for a household to allocate money
and search intensity evenly among buyers.) Let I be the aggregate search intensity per buyer,
which individual households take as given. A buyer searching with intensity i gets a match
with probability αiB(I) in a period, where B ≥ 0. With the normalization α =1 /N, a buyer’s
matching probability per search intensity is B/N. The total number of matches for the particular
household in a period is αNiB = iB. Similarly, the total number of matches per household is
IB. This implies that the matching probability for a seller is IB/(1 − N).
Restrict IB(I) ≤ min{N,1 − N} so that the matching rates IB/N and IB/(1 − N)a r e
indeed probabilities, and assume limI→0 IB(I) = 0 so that search intensity must be positive in
order to generate a match. In addition, we impose the standard assumptions that B0(I) < 0a n d
−B0(I)I<B (I). These assumptions capture the matching externalities. Namely, an increase in
the aggregate search intensity per buyer increases congestion for buyers and reduces congestion
for sellers, resulting in a lower matching rate per search intensity for each individual buyer and
a higher matching rate for each individual seller. Denote η = −B0I/B. Then, η ∈ (0,1).
The disutility of a buyer’s search intensity is denoted L(i). Impose the standard assumptions:
L0 > 0, L00 ≥ 0, and L0(0) = 0 <L 0(∞).
We modify the formulas of a particular household’s utility per period (or welfare) w,q u a l i t y -
weighted consumption y, and the law of motion of money holdings as follows:















The trade decisions are the same as before (see Lemma 2.1). In the current setup, these












where the term iB/N captures the utilization rate of money per buyer. Also, the average quality-







The household’s optimal decision on search intensity satisﬁes the following condition:10
L0(i)N
B(I)











The left-hand side of (5.3) is the marginal disutility of increasing search intensity, normalized by
the buyer’s matching rate per search intensity, B/N. The right-hand side is the buyer’s expected
surplus per trade, averaged over the types of matches. Because a buyer makes take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀers, his average surplus per match is the utility of the average level of quality-weighted
consumption per match minus the average cost of production.11
5.2. Multiple steady states
To determine the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium where i = I, we express other variables
as functions of (¯ z,I). Equation (5.1) deﬁnes I as an implicit function of ¯ z, I = F1(¯ z). This is
always a decreasing function. Next, for a given ¯ z and I, (5.2) can be solved to determine a function
y = Y (¯ z,I). This function can then be inserted into (5.3) to obtain I = F2(¯ z). As shown in
Appendix C and explained later, the function F2(.) may be either decreasing or non-monotonic.
A steady state is such a ¯ z that solves F1(¯ z)=F2(¯ z). If ¯ z = 1, then there is no trade and the
steady state is non-monetary. If ¯ z<1, then the steady state is interior. In this environment,
multiple interior steady states can arise. To illustrate, consider the following example.
10To obtain (5.3), note that ¯ q does not depend on i directly, since ¯ q = c
−1 (ωm/N). Also, the marginal eﬀect of
i on utility through ¯ z is negligible, and so a marginal change in i aﬀects utility entirely through its eﬀects on q
∗(z)
and y.
11The second-order partial derivative of net utility with respect to i is negative under the maintained assumptions
L
00 > 0a n dB
0 < 0. Thus, the optimal choice of i is interior.
13Example 5.1. Consider the functional forms: a(z)=1− z, c(q)=qψ, L(I)=Iξ, B(I)= 1
2I+1
and u(y)=2 y.C h o o s eψ =1 .4, ξ =1 .2 and N =0 .5.
With a linear utility function of consumption, we plot the two curves F1a n dF2i nF i g u r e
3f o rγ/β ∈ {1.00001,1.0004,1.004}.T h e c u r v e F1 changes with the money growth rate, but
the curve F2 does not. For high values of γ/β, no interior steady state exists, except the non-
monetary steady state at ¯ z = 1. For very low values of γ/β, there is only one interior steady
state. For intermediate values of γ/β, multiple interior steady states can exist.
Figure 3 here.
When the utility function is strictly concave, Figure 3 needs modiﬁcation. The curve F2
increases in ¯ z at low levels of ¯ z and then decreases at high levels of ¯ z.T h i sf e a t u r eo fF2a n dt h e
following proposition are proven in Appendix C.
Proposition 5.2. Assume γ > γ1,w h e r eγ1 is deﬁned by (C.8) in Appendix C. Under the
condition limz%1− F0
2(z)/F10(z) > 1, there exists an interior equilibrium and the number of
interior equilibria will be odd. Otherwise the number of interior equilibria will be even, possibly
zero. Between any two steady states, the one with a lower value of ¯ z has higher welfare w,h i g h e r
values of (¯ q,y,I), and lower values of q∗(z) for all z ∈ (¯ z,1).
Multiple steady states can arise in this model because of the interaction between ¯ z and search
intensity. (Recall that the interior steady state is unique when search intensity is ﬁxed.) Imagine
that households believe that a low critical level ¯ z will be optimal. In this case, buyers will be
constrained in only a small fraction of matches and buyers’ average surplus per match will be
high. Anticipating this high surplus, each household will ask the buyers to search intensively.
High search intensity increases the number of matches for each household, increases the utilization
of money, and so increases the expected non-pecuniary return to money. To maintain the steady
state, however, the expected non-pecuniary return to money must be reduced back to the constant
(γ/β −1). A low ¯ z achieves this by reducing the fraction of matches in which money relaxes the
money constraint. That is, a belief of a low ¯ z can be self-fulﬁlling. Similarly, a belief of a high ¯ z,
supported by low search intensity, can be self-fulﬁlling.
We should emphasize that the multiplicity of steady states does not hinge on the speciﬁc
way in which the matching risks are smoothed. In our model, the members share consumption.
14An alternative formulation is to allow agents tos m o o t hu t i l i t y ,a si ti sd o n ei n[ 1 5 ] .T h e s et w o
formulations are the same when the utility function is linear in consumption. As Figure 3 shows,
multiple steady states can arise with a linear utility function. For this reason, multiple equilibria
should arise as well in the framework of [15] when search intensity is endogenized.12
The steady states can be ranked according to welfare, as stated in Proposition 5.2. The
lower the level ¯ z is in a steady state, the higher the level of welfare. We will label the steady
state with the lowest value of ¯ z as the ﬁrst steady state, the steady state with the second lowest
value of ¯ z as the second steady state, and so on. Between two steady states, we will refer to
the one with a low ¯ z as the superior steady state and the one with a high ¯ z as the inferior
steady state. Not surprisingly, a superior steady state has higher consumption of desirable goods,
lower consumption of mediocre goods, and higher quality-weighted consumption. Also, buyers
search more intensively in a superior steady state than in an inferior steady state, because search
intensity and ¯ z must obey the negative relationship I = F1(¯ z) in all steady states.
The level ¯ z is useful not only for comparing steady states, but also for examining local prop-
erties of each steady state, as detailed in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. In every steady state, we can write I, ¯ q, y,a n dw all as functions of ¯ z,s ot h a t
I = I(¯ z), ¯ q =¯ q(¯ z), y = y(¯ z),a n dw = w(¯ z).F o r¯ z>0, ¯ q0(¯ z) < 0, y0(¯ z) < 0,a n dw0(¯ z) < 0.
Also, the quantity of goods in a mediocre match, q∗(z),i n c r e a s e sw i t h¯ z for any given z ∈ (¯ z,1).
However, I0(¯ z) is ambiguous.
This lemma extends the main results, and hence the intuition, from the economy with exoge-
nous search intensity to the current economy with endogenous search intensity. Namely, a higher
¯ z is associated with lower consumption of desirable goods, higher consumption of mediocre goods,
and lower quality-weighted consumption.
There are two new features here. The ﬁrst is the dependence of search intensity on ¯ z.W i t h i n
each steady state, search intensity can either increase or decrease with ¯ z.( T h i s c o n t r a s t s t o
the unambiguously negative relationship between the two variables across steady states.) The
12We should note that all equilibria in our model are symmetric, in the sense that all households play the same
strategy in each equilibrium . I f ,i n s t e a d ,o n ea l l o w sd i ﬀerent households to play diﬀerent strategies, then there
may be a unique asymmetric equilibrium. This is because allowing for heterogeneous strategies between households
enables the economy to “convexify” between diﬀerent symmetric equilibria. Lagos and Rocheteau [14] provide such
an illustration using the framework in [15]. If the strategies in their model are restricted to be symmetric, then
multiple equilibria are likely to emerge.
15ambiguity arises because the curve F2(z) may be non-monotonic. An increase in ¯ z, by reduc-
ing quality-weighted consumption y,a ﬀects the buyer’s average match surplus in two opposite
directions. Although each buyer receives less from each trade when ¯ z is higher, the goods are
more highly valued by the household under diminishing marginal utility of consumption. As a
result, the value of goods received from trade, which is equal to yu0(y), may either increase or
decrease with ¯ z. This generates the ambiguous association between the buyer’s match surplus
and ¯ z. Because buyers are motivated to search by the match surplus, their search intensity may
either increase or decrease with ¯ z. Clearly, when the utility function is linear in consumption,
search intensity always decreases with ¯ z.
The second new feature is that, even when search intensity is a choice variable, welfare is still





+ IB(I)S − NL(I),
where S is given by (5.3). The ﬁrst term of w is caused by the concavity of the utility function;
the second term is the buyers’ total surplus from trade; and the last term is the disutility of







In the special case where u00 = 0, only the last term remains and it is negative (see the above
discussion on search intensity). So, w0(¯ z) < 0. When u00 < 0, search intensity may increase with
¯ z, but such an increase is an attempt to mitigate, but not to eliminate or overtake, the fall in
consumption caused by the increase in ¯ z. T h a ti s ,t h ed i r e c te ﬀect of ¯ z on welfare through y
dominates the eﬀect through search intensity, whatever the latter may be. Again, w0(¯ z) < 0.
5.3. Eﬀects of money growth and inﬂation
Consider a permanent increase in the money growth rate γ.T h ee ﬀects on ¯ z and search intensity
are illustrated in Figure 3 when the utility function is linear in consumption. The curve F1(z)
turns counter-clockwise around the steady state ¯ z = 1, while the curve F2(z) is intact. For strictly
concave utility functions, the eﬀects of money growth on the steady states can be deduced from
Lemma 5.3. We summarize the eﬀects as follows:
16Proposition 5.4. Let k =0 ,1,2,.... In the interior steady states that are ranked (2k +1 ) th in
welfare, an increase in inﬂation increases ¯ z, has ambiguous eﬀects on search intensity, reduces
consumption (output) and welfare. It also reduces ¯ q, widens the range of prices, and increases
prices of all goods. The opposite eﬀects occur in the interior steady states that are ranked
2(k +1 ) th in welfare, with the exception that search intensity increases. Moreover, if search
intensity and ¯ z respond to money growth in the same direction, they must both increase.
The proposition illustrates two discrepancies between our model and some informal arguments.
First, the informal literature argues that inﬂation induces buyers to search. In our model, this is
not necessarily so in the (2k+1) th steady state, including the most superior steady state. Search
intensity necessarily increases with inﬂation only in some “bad” steady states.
Second, in most steady states, inﬂation in our model does not increase both search intensity
and the range of prices. The exceptions occur in the (2k +1 ) th steady state and only when
search intensity increases with inﬂation. To understand this result, recall that inﬂation widens
the range of prices if and only if it reduces the quantity of goods traded in desirable matches, ¯ q.
This reduction in ¯ q will result in higher search intensity only if it raises buyer’s average surplus
in a match, which will happen only if the marginal utility of consumption for the buyer has
increased signiﬁcantly. Otherwise both average surplus and search intensity fall with a greater
range of prices resulting from inﬂation. Or, in the case of the 2(k +1 ) th steady state, higher
inﬂation lowers the range of prices and raises search intensity.
Moreover, when inﬂation does increase search intensity and the range of prices, it reduces
welfare. Thus, it is never the case in our model that inﬂation increases search intensity, widens
the range of prices, and improves welfare all at the same time.
The optimal money growth rate depends on which steady state the economy is in. In the most
superior steady state, an increase in inﬂation reduces welfare. In this case, the optimal money
growth rate is γ = β (i.e., the Friedman rule), provided that pursuing this money growth rate
does not induce the economy to switch from one steady state to another steady state.13 In the
second interior steady state or, in general, in the 2(k +1 ) th interior steady state, an increase in
the money growth rate increases welfare. Of course, there is also a possibility that an increase in
money growth can switch the economy between two steady states.
13This optimal money growth rate is the second-best outcome in the current model, because it fails to internalize
the matching externalities completely. See [5] for the general argument.
176. Discussion
In this section, we examine the stability of steady states and prove that it is optimal for a
household to distribute money evenly among buyers. For both tasks, we simplify the analysis by
assuming that the utility function is linear in consumption.
When there are multiple steady states, a natural question is which steady state is stable.
The notion of stability used here is the same as in [10], which involves some “trembling” in
the equilibrium. In particular, suppose that the initial value of money (ω−1)i sd i ﬀerent from
the steady state value, for some unspeciﬁed reason. Given this initial value ω−1,w eg e n e r a t ea
sequence of equilibrium values of money, {ωt}t≥0. If this sequence converges to the value in a
particular steady state, then the steady state is stable; otherwise, it is unstable.14
Let us start with the economy where search intensity is ﬁxed, in which there is a unique
monetary steady state. Let ωs be the steady state value of ω. To examine the dynamics of ω,
use (2.2) and (2.4) to solve ¯ zt = ζ(ωt). Substitute ¯ z = ζ(ω) to write the right-hand side of (2.9)
as G(ω). Then, ωt−1 = G(ωt). Notice that ζ0 < 0, because a higher value of money reduces
the range of matches in which the money constraint binds. With this property, we can verify
that 0 <G 0(ωs) < 1. Thus, for any initial value ω−1 6= ωs, the sequence {ωt}t≥0 generated by
ωt = G−1(ωt−1) diverges from the monetary steady state ωs. Such instability is also the feature
of the unique monetary steady state in the overlapping generations model of money (e.g., [10]).
When search intensity is endogenous, we can also derive the mapping G, but it is much more
diﬃcult to determine G0 analytically. Numerical examples (not presented here) indicate that
0 <G 0(.) < 1 in the steady state with the highest welfare. So, the most superior steady state is
unstable, just like the unique monetary steady state in the economy with ﬁx e ds e a r c hi n t e n s i t y .
By contrast, the interior steady state ranked the second in welfare has G0(.) > 1, and so this
steady state is stable. In general, the interior steady state ranked (2k+1)th in welfare is unstable
and the interior steady state ranked 2(k +1 ) th is stable, where k =0 ,1,2....
We now turn to the allocation of money among the buyers in a household. One may wonder
whether a household can gain from a deviation to an uneven allocation, e.g., allocating more
14This notion of stability is clearly diﬀerent from dynamic stability in the neoclassical growth model. There,
some variables like capital stocks are predetermined in the sense that their initial values are determined outside the
model. Dynamic stability requires that, given the intial values of these predetermined varaibles, the equilibrium
should converge to the steady state. This stability criterion implies trivial dynamics in our model, because none of
the variables here (including ω) are predetermined. Furthermore, it should be noted that stability is but one way
to select among diﬀerent equilbria.
18money and higher search intensity to some buyers than to other buyers. An extremely uneven
allocation is that some buyers are given no money and not required to search. Eﬀectively, this
extreme allocation amounts to choosing N, the fraction of shoppers in the household — If N is
optimal, the extremely uneven allocation cannot be optimal. Since the current model assumes a
ﬁxed N, it is appropriate to exclude allocations that undo this assumption (for the optimal choice
of N, see [18]). Thus, when examining an uneven allocation, we restrict that it allocate strictly
positive amounts of money and search intensity to every buyer. Then, an uneven allocation is not
optimal: Facing sellers whose production cost function is strictly convex, the quantity of goods
that buyers get is a concave function of the buyer’s money holdings (see (2.4)), and so an uneven
allocation of money is likely to reduce expected utility.
To support our argument, suppose that a particular household deviates to an uneven allocation
for one period, while other households continue to allocate money and search intensity to their
buyers evenly.15 The deviating household divides the buyers into group 1 and group 2. The size
of group j (= 1,2) is nj,w i t hn1 + n2 = N. The household assigns an amount mj/nj to each
buyer in group j,w h e r em1 + m2 = m, and asks him to search with intensity ij. Such a buyer
gets a match with probability ijB(I)/N.D e n o t eµj = Ωmj/nj.A nu n e v e na l l o c a t i o no fm o n e y
requires µ1 6= µ2.W eﬁnd the conditions under which the deviation is not optimal. As explained
above, we restrict 0 <m j <mand ij > 0, for i =1 ,2.
Let md
+1 be the deviating household’s money holdings at the beginning of next period, and
ωd the shadow value of such money discounted to the current period. Denote R = ωd/Ω. A group
j buyer’s trade decisions are characterized similarly to Lemma 2.1. That is,
c(¯ qj)=µj,u 0a(¯ zj)=c0(¯ qj)R,
q∗(z)=c0−1(u0a(z)/R),x ∗(z)=c(q∗(z))/Ω.
From the ﬁrst two equations we solve ¯ qj =¯ q(µj)a n d¯ zj =¯ z(µj,R). With these changes, we can


















15In the proof below, we will maintain the focus on symmetric equilibria. One should not confuse an uneven allo-
cation within each household with an asymmetry between diﬀerent households’ strategies (see the earlier discussion
on multiple equilibria).
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Similarly, we can modify the optimality condition for search intensity, (5.3), as:
NL0(ij)
B(I)















After substituting ¯ qj =¯ q(µj)a n d¯ zj =¯ z(µj,R)), we can write Sj = S(µj,R), and hence the
solution to (6.1) as ij = i(µj,R).
For the deviation to be optimal, m1 must be optimal under the constraint m2 = m−m1,a n d











where λ = ωd
−1/(βωd) − 1. Moreover, the optimality condition for n1, under the constraint
n2 = N − n1,i s
f(µ1,R)=f(µ2,R), (6.3)
where f(µ,R) ≡ [iL0(i) − L(i)]i=i(µ,R) − Rµλ.
The uneven allocation of money and search intensity is not optimal when (6.2) has at most
two solutions for µ. If (6.2) has at most one solution, then clearly µ1 = µ2 and i1 = i2. Suppose
that (6.2) has only two solutions, µ1 and µ2,w i t hµ1 >µ 2. Computing the derivative iµ(µ,R)











By (6.2), it is clear that fµ(µ1,R)=fµ(µ2,R) = 0. Because µ1 and µ2 are the only two solutions
to (6.2), then either T(µ,R) > N
Bλ or T(µ,R) < N
Bλ for all µ ∈ (µ2,µ 1). If T(µ,R) > N
Bλ for all
µ ∈ (µ1,µ 2), then fµ(µ,R) > 0a n df(µ1,R) >f (µ2,R). If T(µ,R) < N
Bλ for all µ ∈ (µ1,µ 2),
then f(µ1,R) <f(µ2,R). Either way, (6.3) is violated and so the uneven allocation is not optimal.
With the functional forms c(q)=qψ and L(i)=iξ that we used in Example 5.1, the function
T(.,R) is either monotone or having one hump. Thus, (6.2) indeed has at most two solutions for
µ, and the deviation to an uneven allocation of money and search intensity is not optimal.
207. Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between inﬂation, welfare and price dispersion in a
model where money’s use is built up from microfoundations. The model has enabled us to study
the eﬃciency with which money is able to allocate heterogeneous goods across heterogeneous
households. In doing so, we have found that raising the money growth rate lowers the ability
for money to allocate goods eﬃciently, as higher money growth lowers the real value of money
which constrains households in their purchases of the goods they most desire. To oﬀset this loss,
households choose to substitute into mediocre goods. The lower eﬃciency in the allocation of
goods lowers welfare. Furthermore, the price of the most desirable goods rises more than the least
desirable goods so that the range of prices widens, i.e. higher price dispersion can be associated
with higher inﬂation.
Another channel through which inﬂation and price dispersion can interact is the buyers’
search intensity. With endogenous search intensity, we ﬁnd that the economy can exhibit multiple
equilibria. Furthermore, in the high welfare equilibrium, an increase in the growth rate of money
can increase search intensity only if an increase in the ineﬃciency in the allocation of goods
associated with higher inﬂation raises the surplus to the buyer in a match. In this case, the range
of prices also widens. However, the increase in search intensity cannot overcome the ineﬃciency
from higher inﬂation, so that higher money growth necessarily lowers welfare in the equilibrium
with the highest level of welfare. On the other hand, if the economy is in an inferior equilibrium,
then higher money growth can raise search intensity and welfare. In this case, however, money
growth shrinks the range of prices.
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A. Proof of Lemma 3.1



























dz > 0. (A.2)
The above properties imply that [y − RHS(y,¯ z)] is strictly increasing in y and ¯ z (> 0). Fix
¯ z and examine [y − RHS(y,¯ z)] as a function of y. For existence and uniqueness of the solution
for y, it is necessary and suﬃcient that this function crosses 0 only once. Under the assumptions
that c0(∞)=∞ and u0(0) is suﬃciently large, we have Q(0, ¯ z) > 0, and so y − RHS(y,¯ z) < 0a t
y =0 . A l s o ,l i m y→∞ [y − RHS(y,¯ z)] > 0. Therefore, there exists a unique solution for y.T h e
solution Y (¯ z)c l e a r l ys a t i s ﬁes Y 0(¯ z) ≤ 0, with equality only for ¯ z =0 .QED
B. Proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
For Proposition 4.1, it is apparent from (3.1) that d¯ z/dγ > 0. Because Y 0(¯ z) < 0a n dd¯ z/dγ > 0,
we have
dy
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From equation (3.4), since ¯ q is decreasing in ¯ z and q∗ increasing in ¯ z, then the price p(z)i s
increasing in γ. The range of prices, ∆p =¯ p, also increases because the reduction in ¯ q raises
¯ p. However, it can be shown that the standard deviation of prices responds to the increase in γ
ambiguously. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Turn to Proposition 4.2. For the equilibrium steady state to be eﬃcient, ¯ z must be equal to
the eﬃcient value, which is 0. This requires γ = β. On the other hand, if γ = β,t h e n¯ z =0 .I n
22this case, the equation for y in the equilibrium (i.e., (3.3)) is identical to the equation for yo (i.e.,
(4.2)), and so y = yo. Since other equilibrium variables are only functions of (y,¯ z), and since
(y,¯ z) are equal to the eﬃcient values, the values of those variables are eﬃcient.
For any γ > β, the dependence of (y,¯ z)o nz established in Proposition 4.1 implies ¯ z>¯ zo
and y<y o. Measure the level of welfare per period in the steady state by w. Then,




Using c0(¯ q)=u0(y)a(¯ z)a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of K in (A.2), we have:
dw
dγ








Clearly, dw/dγ < 0i ﬀ J(¯ z) > ¯ za(¯ z). The function [J(z) − za(z)] is an increasing function of z
and, when z = 0, it is equal to 0. Thus, J(¯ z) > ¯ za(¯ z) for all ¯ z>0, i.e., for all γ > β. QED
C. Proofs for section 5
In this appendix, we will omit the argument ¯ z in a(¯ z), a0(¯ z), and J(¯ z). When the argument is z
rather than ¯ z, we will specify it explicitly. Similarly, abbreviate c0(¯ q)a sc0 and c00(¯ q)a sc00.
C.1. The relationship I = F2(¯ z) and the proof of Proposition 5.2
The relationship I = F2(¯ z) arises from (5.2) and (5.3). Recall that q∗ = Q(y,z)a n d¯ q = Q(y,¯ z),
where Q is deﬁned by (3.2). Then, (5.2) becomes:
y
IB(I)




Similar to Lemma 3.1, this equation yields a unique solution for y for given ¯ z and I.D e n o t et h i s
solution as y = Y (¯ z,I). Substitute y = Y (¯ z,I)a n dq∗ = Q(y,z)i n t o( 5 . 3 ) :
L0(I)N
B(I)
= S (Y (¯ z,I),Q(Y (¯ z,I), ¯ z)), (C.2)
where S(y, ¯ q) is a buyer’s average surplus per trade, given as follows:
S(y, ¯ q)=
£









( N o t i c et h a tt h ec r i t i c a ll e v e l¯ z also appears in this expression independently, but its marginal
eﬀect on S is zero once its eﬀects through (y, ¯ q)a r eﬁxed.) The equation (C.2) involves only ¯ z
23and I, and so it determines a relationship between I and ¯ z.T h i si st h er e l a t i o n s h i pI = F2(¯ z)
used in section 5.
To prove Proposition 5.2, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the proper domain of F1(¯ z) by requiring that the
matching rates for a buyer and a seller, IB/N and IB/(1 − N), be bounded above by one.
Express this requirement as IB(I) ≤ min{N,1 − N}.D e ﬁne IH by IHB(IH)=m i n {N,1 − N},
















The proper domain of F1(¯ z)i s¯ z ∈ [aL,1] and the range is [0,I H]. Notice that [J(z)/a(z) − z]
approaches 0 when z → 0. Thus, zL > 0 for all γ > β,a n dzL → 0w h e nγ → β.
Second, we explore the features of the two relationships, I = F1(¯ z)a n dI = F2(¯ z). The
function F1(z) is always decreasing, as is clear from (5.1). However, F2(z)m a yb ean o n -







IB − u00(y)[a(¯ z)J(¯ z)+Kc00(¯ q)]





c00(¯ q)y(1 − η)/I
c00(¯ q) − IBu00(y)[a(¯ z)J(¯ z)+Kc00(¯ q)]
> 0. (C.6)
Here, η = −B0I/B ∈ (0,1) and K>0i sd e ﬁn e di n( A . 2 ) .E x p r e s s i n gS in (C.3) as a function
of (¯ z,I)b yw r i t i n g( y, ¯ q)a sf u n c t i o n so f( ¯ z,I), we can verify that S is a decreasing function of I.
















This condition is clearly violated when u00 =0 ;t h u s ,F2(z) is always negatively sloped if utility
is linear in consumption. Also, F20(¯ z) < 0w h e n¯ z → 1, because y → 0i nt h a tc a s e .H o w e v e r ,i f
u00 < 0a n d¯ z → 0, then ¯ za/J → 1 and so (C.7) is satisﬁed. Thus, F20(¯ z) > 0w h e nu00 < 0a n d¯ z
is close to 0.
Third, we compare the values of F1(z)a n dF2(z) at the two endpoints of the domain [zL,1].
Restrict attention to γ > β,s ot h a tzL > 0. Temporarily denote the right-hand side of (C.2) as
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I=F1(z)
.
24Because L0(I)N/B(I) is an increasing function of I,t h e nF2(z) <F1(z)i ﬀ D(z) < 0.
Consider z = zL.S i n c ezL is an increasing function of γ (see (C.4)), it is meaningful to deﬁne
γ1 =i n f{γ : D(zL) < 0,γ ≥ β}. (C.8)
Because F1(zL)=IH by deﬁnition, then D(zL) < 0i ﬀ RHS(zL,F2(zL)) <L 0(IH)N/B(IH).
Notice that IH does not depend on γ.W h e n γ →∞ , zL → 1, and so RHS(zL) → 0 <
L0(IH)N/B(IH). Thus, γ1 < ∞.M o r e o v e r ,D(zL) < 0 for all γ > γ1.
Next, consider z =1 . N o t et h a tQ(y,1) = 0, because a(1) = 0 and c0(0) = 0. Then,
RHS(1,I)=0f o ra l lI>0. This implies F2(1) = 0 under the assumption L0(0) = 0. Also,
because [J(z)/a(z) − z] approaches ∞ as z → 1 and because limI→0 IB(I)=0 ,( 5 . 1 )i m p l i e s
F1(1) = 0. Therefore, F1(1) = F2(1). That is, ¯ z = 1 is always a steady state.
Now, consider z =1−ε,w h e r eε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. Because F2(1) = F1(1),
then F2(1 − ε) >F 1(1 − ε)i ﬀ F20(1) <F 10(1). Since F10(1) < 0, this condition is equivalent
to F20(1)/F10(1) > 1. When this condition holds, there are an odd number of interior steady
states because D(zL) < 0a n dD(1 − ε) > 0. Similarly, the number of interior steady states is
even (possibly zero) when F20(1)/F10(1) < 1.
Finally, compare two steady states, one of which has a higher value of ¯ z than the other. As
stated later in Lemma 5.3, (w, ¯ q,y) are all decreasing functions of ¯ z, and so the lower the value
of ¯ z in a steady state, the higher the values of (w, ¯ q,y). Also, for any given z ∈ (¯ z,1), q∗(z)i s
decreasing in ¯ z, and so a steady state with a lower ¯ z has higher values of q∗(z). To compare
the levels of search intensity between two steady states, note that I = F1(¯ z) in all steady states.
Since F10 < 0, then a steady state with a lower ¯ z has higher search intensity. QED
C.2. Proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Proposition 5.4
The equation (C.2) expresses search intensity as I = F2(¯ z). Substituting this function into
y = Y (¯ z,I), we express y as a function of ¯ z:
y = y(¯ z) ≡ Y (¯ z,F2(¯ z)).
Then, ¯ q = Q(y(¯ z), ¯ z), which is a function of only ¯ z. Substituting I = F2(¯ z)a n dy = y(¯ z)i n t o
the expression for welfare, we can write the level of welfare as w = w(¯ z).
Search intensity does not necessarily increase with ¯ z,b e c a u s eI = F2(¯ z) and the function F2
is not necessarily an increasing function. Diﬀerentiating y = y(¯ z), ¯ q =¯ q(¯ z)a n dw = w(¯ z), and
































































c00 − IBu00(aJ + Kc00)
> 0.
Because Y1 ≤ 0, Y2 > 0, B0 < 0, a0 < 0, and u00 ≤ 0, then dy, d¯ q and dw all have the same sign,
which is opposite to the sign of d¯ z.M o r e o v e r ,f o rz ∈ (¯ z,1), the quantity of goods in the match
is q∗(z)=Q(y,z). Since Q decreases with y and y decreases with ¯ z, q∗(z)i n c r e a s e sw i t h¯ z for
any given z ∈ (¯ z,1). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3.





F20(¯ z) − F10(¯ z)
.
Recall that ∂F1/∂γ > 0. In the steady state with the highest welfare, F20(¯ z) >F10(¯ z), and so
d¯ z/dγ > 0. In the interior steady state ranked the second in welfare, F20(¯ z) <F 10(¯ z), and so
d¯ z/dγ < 0. In general, d¯ z/dγ > 0 in the interior steady state ranked (2k +1 ) th in welfare and
d¯ z/dγ < 0 in the interior steady state ranked 2(k +1 ) th,w h e r ek =0 ,1,2,....T h er e s p o n s e so f
I, y and w can then be deduced from Lemma 5.3. Finally, suppose that dI/dγ and d¯ z/dγ have
the same sign. Because dI/dγ = F20(¯ z)d¯ z/dγ,w eh a v eF20(¯ z) > 0 >F 10(¯ z). From the above
formula for d¯ z/dγ,w eh a v ed¯ z/dγ > 0, and so dI/dγ > 0. QED
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Figure 2: Prices in a match of type z, p(z), and the eﬀect of money growth.
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Figure 3: Multiple equilbria and the eﬀects of increasing money growth.
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